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When should an appellate judge consider recusal from
participation in an assigned case? Are mandated recusals
automatic? Enforceable? Who decides when the appearance of
impropriety requires recusal? Are there circumstances in which
the rule of necessity overrides a rule suggesting disqualification?
The three essays that follow illuminate these and other
questions. They address the issues in depth, but with clarity that
makes for excellent, thought-provoking reading.
I venture to add to this discussion the observation that in
Arkansas at least, the principle that a judge has a duty to remain
on a case except when disqualification is required runs into
difficulty when, as an example, sitting judges may be called
upon to decide the validity of a new tax applicable to all
Arkansas residents. The Arkansas Constitution, which provides
that "no justice shall participate in any case in which he or she
might be interested in the outcome,"' might seem to require the
entire court to step aside. But replacement judges, required by
the same constitution to be qualified electors, would also be
disqualified in such a case. It is clear, in short, that there are
1. Ark. Const. amend. 80, § 13.
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instances in which the rule of necessity trumps the rule
suggesting recusal, as the Arkansas Supreme Court has held.2
Pervading the issues of recusal looms the need for public
confidence in the fairness and integrity of the judicial branch of
government. These essays shine a bright light upon this inquiry,
and as both a citizen and a former appellate judge, I hope that all




2. White v. Priest, 73 S.W.3d 572 (Ark. 2002) (per curiam). Similar considerations
sometimes arise in cases before the United States Supreme Court, where a recusing justice
cannot be replaced, and where, as a result of a recusal, tie votes become possible.
